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Abstract
In this paper a macroeconomic model of optimal profit taxation deve-
loped by Gradus (1990, Chapter 4) is extended through incorporation of a
tax rate on pollution. It is assumed that the representative firm owns two
different stocks of capital goods. The first one is productive but also
generates pollution, and the second one is non productive but cleans pol-
lution.
The problem is modelled as a Stackelberg differential game such that
the government is the leader; the firms and consumers, each represented by
one, are the followers playing Nash against each other. Open-loop and
feedback equilibria are studied and a numerical example is used to gain
some further insights. We show that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
leads to a higher level of welfare, but not necessarily to a lower level
of pollution.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, during which a clean environment becomes more and more
a scarce commodity, economists have shown an increasing interest in the
problem of reducing the pollution output of firms. An important questíon
in this respect is what kind of policy instruments the government, in its
role as social planner, should choose to reduce the level of pollution. In
the economic literature it is argued that from an economic point of view
the government should try to diminish the firm's pollution by introducing
a pollution tax rate rather than imposing laws and~or production restric-
tions on the firm.
The influence of pollution tax on the behavior of a profit maximizing
firm was studied in a paper by Kort, Van Loon and Luptacik (1990). It
turned out that the optimal policy of the firm over time mainly depended
on the relationships between the values of the different unit costs, in
which also the pollution tax rate occurs. However, a major drawback of
this model is that the policy of the government, i.e. fixing the pollution2
tax rate, is taken exogenously in the sense that only the behavior of the
firm is maximized. By doing this the Lucas critique (cf. Lucas (1976)),
which states that the interactions between private and public sector
should be evaluated when we want to derive the incidence of different tax
rate, is not taken into account. The Lucas critique can be dealt with by
modelling the problem as a dynamic game between private and public sector.
Starting point of this kind of research is a paper by Fischer (1980),
where in a simple two-period model the trade off between capital and labor
tax is described. Also the issue of time-inconsistency, which occurs when
having distortionary taxation, is discussed in that paper. The main con-
clusion is that if the government commits its tax policy, it yields a
higher level of welfare. Later on the Fischer framework has been extended
by many authors to other tax rates (cf. Rogers (1987), Chang (1988)) and
political aspects (cf. Persson and Svensson (1989), Alesina and Tabellini
(1987)). In this paper the route of optimal taxation will be followed and
we show that the pollution tax rate can be time-inconsistent. Moreover, we
focus on the policy implications of this conclusion.
Starting point of this paper will be the decentralized market model of
Abel and Blanchard (1983) in which the policy of the government was taken
exogenously. In this paper a general equilibrium model with utility maxi-
mizing consumers and value maximizing firms, which face costs of adjust-
ment, was preserrted and the incidences of different tax rates were analy-
zed. We extend this research in two directions. First, we model the go-
vernment's behavior endogenously, where it maximizes the utility of a
representative agent. Here, we assume that the firms and consumers behave
atomistically, while the government is the leader within a Stackelberg
game. We study the commitment and no-commitment solution of this game.
Second, we incorporate a pollution tax rate.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we model the firms' and
consumers' decision problem. Furthermore, the equilibrium in the goods and
labor market is described while in Section 3 we present optimal govern-
ment's behavior under the condition that it takes into account the way
that agents make their decisions and that there is an open-loop informa-
tion structure. The feedback case is studied in Section 4 where also a
numerical example is presented. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude this
paper.3
2. THE FIRM'S AND CONSIJMER'S DECISION PROBLEM
For reasons of analytical tractability we assume that there is only one
representative type of consumer and firm.
2.1. The model of the firm
Consider a firm operating in an environment without exogenous uncer-
tainty. The firm produces a homogeneous output by means of its factors
capital and labor. The firm's output can be used for different kinds of
public and private spendings. With respect to the production function we
assume that capital and labor are substitutes and there is a constant
returns to scale technology, so that
f- f(k,~), f(k,0) - 0, f(0,~) - 0, fk ) 0, f~ ) 0, fR~fkk - fk~ - 0, (1)
where f, k and ~ denote the amount of production, the stock of capital
goods and the number of employed workers.
As an inevitable by-product production causes pollution. In the litera-
ture there is some discussion about the source of pollution. Van der Ploeg
and Withagen (1991) take pollution as a linear function of production,
Feichtinger and Luptácik (198~) take a convex function of the labor force.
Luptácik and Schubert (1982) have three sources of pollution: consumption,
production and the capital stock. As argued in "Zorgen voor Morgen" (1989)
the main source of pollution is captured in the capital force and not in
the labor force. Here it is assumed that the amount of pollution is a
convex function of capital goods. Furthermore, it is assumed that this
amount of pollution can be reduced through investment in a second kind of
capital goods which is non productive, but cleans pollution instead. The
amount by which pollution output is decreased, is assumed to be a concave
function of the stock of those abatement capital goods
e- PÍk) - m(u), P~(k) ) 0. P"(k) 2 0,
p(0) - 0, m'(u) ) 0, m"(u) s 0, m(0) - 0, (2)4
where e, k and u denote the amount of pollution, the polluted and produc-
tive capital stock, and the cleaning and non productive capital stock,
respectively. The firm is confronted with two taxes, because the govern-
ment asks s proportional tax on profits and pollution. Furthermore, we
assume that both investing in capital goods that are productive, as well
as in capital goods that clean pollution, generates internal adjustment
costs, which in both cases are a convex function of the investment rate
P1 - P1(i). Pi(i) ~ o if i~ o. Pï(i) ) o, P1(o) - 0, (3)
P2 - P2(a). P2(a) ~ 0 if a~ 0, p2(a) ~ o. P2(o) - o, (4)
where ~pl, P2, i, a represent the adjustment costs of i, the adjustment
costs of a, the investment rate assigned to the productive capital stock
and the investment rate assigned to the capital stock that cleans pollu-
tion, respectively. According to the information described above the pre-
sent value of the firm's cash flow can be defined as
m





in which T1, T2, w and r denote the proportional tax on profits, the pro-
portional tax on pollution, the wage rate and the interest rate. We assume
that the firm takes these taxes and prices as given.
The decision problem of the representative firm is to choose time-paths
of investment in both kinds of capital goods and employment that maximize
Vo subject to the accumulation equations:
k - i - Slk, (6)
u - a - b2u, (~)5
with bl and b2 symbolizing the rate of exponential depreciation for both
capital goods.
Solving the firm's problem is a straightforward exercise of Pontrye-
gin's maximum principle from which the following necessary conditions for
an optimum can be obtained (e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986))
- 1 - ~i(~) t 41 - 0. (8)
- 1- V2Ía) t q2 - 0,
ql - (rtbl)91 - fk(1-T1) t T2P'(k),





where the symbols ql and q2 stand for the shadow prices of the polluted
and abatement capital. From equations (8) and (9) we obtain:
i- i(91). i(1) - 0, i'(91) ~ 0. (13)
a- a(92). a(1) - 0. a'(q2) ~ 0. (14)
From (6), (8) and ( 10) we get that the steady-state level of productive
capital stock satisfies:
(1-il)fk - (rtbl){1 t~i(blk')} } ~ZP~(k~), k~ ~ 0. k,"L ~ 0, kr ~ 0. (15)
1 2
On the left-hand side of (15) we have the marginal revenue net from profit
taxation, while on the right-hand side we find the marginal costs consis-
ting of the sum of the discount rate and depreciation rate, corrected for
the fact that 1 t pi(blk') dollars are required for a marginal increase of
the polluted capital goods level, and of the extra pollution tax that must
be paid when the polluted capital stock increases with one unit.6
The equations (7), (9) and (11) lead to the following equation for the
steady-state level of the abatement capital goods:l)
T2m'(u") -(r.ó2){1 t 9o2(b2u")}, ur C 0, u~ ) 0
2
(16)
Like (15), also (16) is a relation that equates marginal revenue to margi-
nal costs, but now for the cleaning capital goods. Notice that the margi-
nal revenue of these capital goods consist of the decrease in pollution
tax due to an extra unit of abatement capital goods.
2.2. The model of the consumer
The welfare of consumers positively depends on private consumption (c),
public consumption (g) and negatively on the amount of pollution (e)
m
U~ - f u(c,g,e)exp(-6t)dt, uc ) 0, ug ) 0, ue C 0,
0
where o is a(constant) rate of time-preference. Similar to Abel and Blan-
chard (1983) and Van de Klundert and Peters (1986) the consumers maximize
U~ with respect to consumption and subject to the dynamic budget
constraint
b- rb f rt t w,~ - c, (18)
where b and rr are the amount of bonds held by the consumer and the obtain-
ed dividends.
Again the standard solution technique can be applied to obtain necessa-
ry conditions for an optimum
-------------------------------------------------------
(19)
1) Notice that a steady state value of u does not exist if T2 comes close
to zero. However, we assume that the government's disutility of pollution
is that large that it will always fix T2 such, that it is sufficiently
high to guarantee existence of a steady state value of u.x - (6-r)x, (20)
where x denotes the costate variable associated to the dynamic budget
constraint.
To exclude paths from borrowing forever we assume that there are No-
Ponzi-Games
t
lim exp(- f r(v)dv)b(t) - 0. (21)
t~ 0
In Subsection 2.1 we did not say anything about the way the firms finance
their investment. After paying wages to the worker, the firm has to decide
how to distribute profit and finance investment by retained earnings or by
issuing new shares or bonds. For example, we can assume that replacement
investment is financed out of retained earnings and that net investment is
financed by bonds. However, because equity and bonds are treated equally
by the tax system and there is no uncertainty, the conditions of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem hold, thus all financing schemes are equivalent
in the sense that they lead to the same path of total consumption and
investment; they differ, however, in terms of institutional arrangements
(for a proof of this see Abel and Blanchard (1983, pp. 680-681)).
2.3. The markets
In this economy there are two markets: the goods and the labor market.
We assume that the goods market is in equilibrium, so that demand is equal
to supply
f(k.~) - c} g t i t~1(i) t a t p2(a). (22)
From this equation the interest rate r, which is the relative price be-
tween current and future consumption, can be derived (e.g. Abel and Blan-
chard (1983)).
Concerning the labor market we assume that unions behave myopically and
that they are shortsighted. According to Oswald (1985) this results in a
fixed level of wages. It is also possible to model a labor market, where w
is determined by supply. As a consequence of this fixed wage assumption,8
the capital labor ratio and the marginal productivity of capital are con-
stant, say d and h,
.i - hk. (?3)
fk - d. (24)
In equations (1)-(24) we have an extended version of the decentralized
Abel and Blanchard model with pollution. From these equations the optimal
values of all variables, except the tax rates T1 and T2 and government
consumption, can be derived. In the next section we derive the optimal
values of these variables.
3. OPTIMAL GOVF.RNNIENT POLICIES
Before we formulate the necessary conditions for an optimal solution we
make some additional assumptions. First, we assume that the government has
the same utility function as the consumers (cf. Turnovsky and Brock
(1980)), and that the consumers' preferences are of Cobb-Douglas type:
u(c,g,e) - a~n c t(1-a)~n g-~~n e, 0 C a( 1, Q ~ 0. (25)
Second, there is a balanced budget policy, so that public consumption will
be financed from pollution and profit taxation:
g- T1{f(k,~) - w~} t t2{p(k) - m(u)}. (26)
Third, as already stated before, the government takes into account the way
the consumers and firms behave. In this respect it should be noted that
the consumers' co-state variable belonging to the budget constraint, which
is denoted by x, can be eliminated. Substitution of (22) into (19) gives
us a value for x. This elimination of x stems from the fact that the
stream of consumption and investment will not be influenced from financial
streams. Similar to the Abel and Blanchard model the consumers only play a
passive role through clearing the goods market.8
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the consumers and firms behave. In this respect it should be noted that
the consumers' co-state variable belonging to the budget constraint, which
is denoted by x, can be eliminated. Substitution of (22) into (19) gives
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Furthermore, the equilibrium of the goods market gives us the interest
rate. Following the approach of e.g. Barro (1979) we treat the interest
rate as exogenous to the system.2)
By usii~g the information obtained until now, the government's problem can
be captured in the following optimal control problem:




k' 1(ql) - Slk~ k(~) ' kp ~ B~ (29)
u- a(q2) - óZu, u(0) - u~ ~ 0,
91 - (rtbl)ql - d(1-T1) t T2P~(k),





c-(1-T1)dk t whk - i(ql) -~1(i(91))-a(92)-9~2(a(q2)) - T2{P(k)-m(u)},
(33)
g - Tldk t T2{p(k)-m(u)},
e - p(k) - m(u).




2) An alternative could be to let the interest rate depend on the state
variables and the instruments of the government:
r- r(k. u. ql, q2. T1. T2) (27)10
H~ - a in[(1-il)dk . whk - i(91) - ~1(i(ql)) - a(q2) - ~2(a(q2)) -
- Tz{p(k) - m(u)}] t(1-a)~n[Tidk t T2{p(k) - m(u)}] -
- ~ ~n[P(k) - m(u)] t ~1{i(ql)-álk} t ~Z{a(q2) - á2u} .
t vl{(rtál)ql - d(1-T1) t 22p'(k)} t v2{(rtá2)q2 - TZm'(u)}, (36)
in which:
al: the government's co-state variable of the stock of productive capital
goods
a2: the government's co-state variable of the stock of cleaning capital
goods
vl: the government's co-state variable of the firm's co-state variable of
the stock of productive captital goods
vZ: the government's co-state variable of the firm's co-state variable of
the stock of cleaning capital goods
For an interior solution the necessary conditions are as follows:
H~ - dk(- ~. lga) t dvl - o, (37)
1
H~ -(P(k) - m(u))(- ~ t lga) t v1P(k) - v2m'(u) - o,
2
~1 -(otól)~1 - ~{(1-T1)b t wh - TZp'(k)} - lga {Tlb t ~Zp'(k)} t
(38)
- vliZp"(k) t ~ p~(k} (39)
~2 -(óib2)~2 t m'(u) {T2(- C t 1-a) -~} t v i m"(u). g e 2 2
vl -(6-r-ól)vl t ~{i'(91)(1 t~i(i(91))} -~li'(ql). vl(o) - 0,
(40)
(41)
v2 - (6-r-b2)v2 ~ a'(92){~ (1 t ~2(a(92)) - ~2}, v2(0) - 0. (42)11
In (37) we find the effects of a marginal profit tax change. A marginal
momentarily increase of T1 results in an extra income for the government
of dk, and this also equals the extra loss for the private sector. There-
fore, public consumption increases with dk, which results in an extra
utility for the government of dk(1-a)~g. Also, the private consumption
decreases with dk, due to which utility decreases by dk~~c.
Another effect of the increase of profit taxation is that owning produc-
tive capital goods becomes less attractive to the firm. This "attractive-
ness" is measured by the firm's co-state variable of productive capital
goods ql. By solving the differential equation (10) and using the steady
state values of ql and k as fixed point we obtain the following expression
for ql:
ql(t) - fm{d(1-T1) - T2p'(k)}exp(-(r.bl)(s-t))ds.
t
(43)
From (43) we can conclude that a marginal momentarily increase of il re-
sults in a decrease of ql by d units. Due to the fact that vl is the go-
vernment's co-state variable belonging to ql, the government values this
decrease by vld. A decrease of ql means that the firm values investments
to be less attractive, and therefore future productive capita7 goods and
profits decrease, which results in less profit taxation income for the
government. Thus, the government will assign a negative value to a decrea-
se of ql, implying that vld is negative so that vl must be negative.
To summarize: an increase of profit taxation implies an increase of public
consumption, which is of course a positive effect for the government. But,
the negative effects are the decrease of private consumption and the de-
crease of attractiveness of investing for the firm. The latter results in
less future productive capital goods so that future profit taxation income
of the government decreases. Now we are able to see that (37) implies that
for an interior solution all marginal effects of an increase of Y1 sum up
to zero. This kind of trade off is well known from Ramsey types of models
(e.g. RamseY (1927)).
The implicatíons of a marginal pollution tax change can be found in (38).
A marginal increase of the pollution tax rate results in extra taxation12
income for the government of p(k) - m(u). This leads to a shift from pri-
vate consumption to public consumption and the change in government utili-
ty of this consumption effect equals (p(k) - m(u))(-a~c t(1-a)~g), An-
other effect of a higher pollution tax rate is that pollution output be-
comes more costly to the firm, and therefore the attractiveness of owning
polluted capital goods decreases. This attractiveness is measured by ql
and from (43) we obtain that increasing i2 momentarily with one unit leads
to a decrease of ql with p'(k). The government values this decrease with
vlp'(k).
But, pollution output becoming more costly also implies that owning
cleaning capital goods, which diminish pollution, becomes more attractive
to the firm. This is measured by the firm's co-state variable of cleaning




q2(t) - f T2m'(u)exp(-(rtb2)(s-t))dt.
t
(44)
Hence, increasing T2 by one unit implies an increase of q2 by m'(u) units,
where m'(u) equals the extra decrease of pollution output due to a margi-
nal increase of u. The government values this increase of q2 by -v2m'(u),
because v2 is the government's co-state variable of q2. The fact that the
cleaning capital goods become more attractive to the firm is positively
valued by the government, because it implies that the firm's pollution
output will decrease. Hence, v2 will be negative.
To summarize: an increase of the pollution tax rate has a consumption and
a pollution effect. Due to a higher tax income there will be a shift from
private to public consumption. The fact that polluting the environment
becomes more expensive for the firm implies that the attractiveness of the
polluted capital goods decreases and the attractiveness of the cleaning
capital goods increases. Equation (38) says that within the interior solu-
tion the consumption effect and the pollution effect of a marginal increa-
se of the pollution tax rate sum up to zero.i3
From the negativity of vl and (3~) we can conclude that marginal utility
from public consumption ((1-a)~g) is less than marginal utility from pri-
vate consumption. The government gives up a piece of its government con-
sumption to stimulate capital accumulation. This is contrary to Fischer
(1980) where marginal utility from private consumption equals marginal
utility from public consumption.
So far, we described an optimal taxation plan for the government. How-
ever, this optimal plan is time-inconsistent, because there is an incenti-
ve for the government to reoptimize and reconsider its tax strategy at
some later date. From the point of view of stimulating productive capital
accumulation the government should announce a policy of low profit tax
rate and low pollution tax rate. But, on the other hand more productive
capital implies more pollution output and, therefore, it would be recom-
mendable to accompany stimulation of accumulating productive capital goods
witli stimulating accumulation of cleaning capital goods. This can be done
by announcing a high pollution tax rate. Hence there are two contrary
mechanisms working on fixing the pollution tax rate. On the one hand, it
should be low to stimulate productive capital accumulation and on the
other hand it should be high to diminish pollution output.
Once the productive capital is installed, the government has an incen-
tive to renege on its announcement and to introduce a higher tax rate on
both profit and pollution. Notice that the government's co-states belon-
ging to the firm's co-states of both capital goods must equal zero at the
start of the planning period, because the firm's co-states are free to
jump at that point of time and, therefore, they become effectively addi-
tional policy instruments for the government. If the government has the
possibility at some later point of time to make a new initial plan, those
co-states belonging to the firm's co-states again become zero. At a moment
that almost all capital is installed, there is an incentive for the go-
vernment to increase the tax rates, so much that marginal utility from
private consumption equals marginal utility from public consumption, i.e.
g~c -(1-a)~a. The more the vl deviates from zero the more the government
can gain by manipulating ql through letting the tax rates T1 and T2 devia-
te from the original plan, thus through cheating the firm. The same holds
for v2 in connection with manipulating q2 through changing the tax rate14
T2. In this way ~vl~ and ~v2~ can be interpreted as the government's costs
for sticking to its announced plan.
If the firm has no reason to believe that the government will stick to
its initial plan, the concept used in this section, which corresponds to
an open-loop equilibrium of a Stackelberg game, is no longer a useful
concept. In the literature three main streams can be qualified for solving
the problem of time-inconsistency. The first attempt is what is called the
loss of leadership (cf. Buiter (1983)). In this view the government gives
up its role as leader and the interactions between private sector and
government is viewed as a Nash rather than a Stackelberg dynamic game. The
acceptance of this view would, however, mean the denial of existence of
policies which have announcement effects, such as tax policies. Secondly,
memory strategies, threats and incentives can be used to sustain the time-
inconsistent solution (cf. Backus and Driffill (1985), Barro and Gordon
(1983)). Thirdly, we can use recursive or so-called feedback methods. The
present government's leadership is preserved with respect to the private
sector, but it is lost with respect to future governments, which are free
to optimize.
The aim of the next section is to use the third approach to solve the
time-inconsistency problem. Hence, for the model under consideration we
derive the feedback Stackelberg solution in the next section.
4. THE FEEDBACK STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we derive the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium for the
model described in the previous sections. By constructing this equilibrium
we assume that the firms ignore their influence on the level of taxation.
So, this equilibrium can be interpreted as the nocommitment equilibrium
with "atomistic" behavior of firms and consumers. Due to these additional
assumptions it is possible to obtain the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
by putting the co-state variables vl and v2 equal to zero3) (cf, condi-
tions (37)-(42)).
-------------------------------------------------------
3) For a proof that it is possible to construct the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium in such a way in these kinds of models, see Gradus ( 1990, pp.
152-155).15
From equations (37) and (38) it follows that along the equilíbrium the
following equation holds: g~c - 1-a~a. In the feedback Stackelberg equi-
librium the marginal utilities from private and public consumption are
equal. In the open-loop equilibrium the government gives up a piece of its
government consumption to stimulate accumulation. In the feedback equi-
librium there is no reason to do so because the firms do not believe such
an announcement due to the fact that, in absence of any commitment, the
government can deviate at any time.
It should be noticed that it is not possible to obtain the pollution
and profit tax rate from equations (37) and (38) in a direct way. However,
from point of view of the government there seems to be no reason why the
level of pollution and profit tax should be different, because both taxes
cause the same distortions. In general it seems reasonable that the profit
tax rate will be higher in the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. There-
fore, there will be less polluted capital in this economy and the shadow
price of capital, i.e. ql, is lower in the feedback Stackelberg equili-
brium. General statements about a comparison of the pollution tax rate in
the feedback and open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium cannot be made. As
already stated in Section 3 the government could impose a high pollution
tax rate to stimulate accumulation of the cleaning capital stock. So, it
is possible that the level of pollution in the feedback Stackelberg equi-
librium is lower than in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium.
The nature of the solutions examined may be further classified by a
numerical example. Assume quadratic adjustment costs for both functions
~1(i) - ~1.i2.
~2(a) - nZ.a2.
and a Cobb-Douglas production function
(46)
f(k ~) - k~~l-~
(47)
Here, it is assumed that the amount of pollution is a linear function of k
and u (cf. (2)), i.e.:16
P(k) - Pk. (48)
m(u) - mu. (49)
Furthermore, choose the following parameter values: w- 0.5, nl -~2 - 4,
~- 0.375, S1 - b2 - 0.05. a- 0.9, 6- 0.03, ~- 0.2, P- 1. m- 1,2. The
steady-state values for the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
can be found by a numerical procedure and they are given in Table 1.
[insert Table 1]
This example clearly reveals the difference between the open-loop and
feedback equilibria. The feedback equilibrium yields a higher value of the
steady-state profit tax rate and a lower level of the polluted but produc-
tive capital stock than the open-loop equilibrium (see Table 1). Further-
more, also the pollution tax rate is higher in the feedback equilibrium.
Therefore, the cleaning but nonproductive capital stock will be higher.
The result of these two effects is that for this example the amount of
pollution in the feedback equilibrium is lower. Moreover, it should be
noticed that in the open-loop case the share of public consumption goods
in total output is not so high as in the feedback case but private
consumption and total utility will be higher because there is more
capital. Finally, as we should expect the utility level in the feedback
equilibrium is lower than in the open-loop equilibrium. The decrease in
utility caused by the lower productive capital stock is greater than the
increase in utility caused by the lower level of pollution.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the impact of profit and pollution tax on dynamic firm
behavior is studied within a general equilibrium model. T'he tax rates are
determined endogenously by assuming that the government maximizes utility.
'the problem is formulated as a Stackelberg differentisl game with the
government as leader, which is studied for the open-loop as well as the
feedback case.17
The optimal level of the firms' capital stock is determined by an equa-
lity between net marginal revenue and marginal costs, where the latter
consist of the cost of capital, corrected for adjustment costs, plus mar-
ginal pollution tax expenses. In the feedback equilibrium the government
fixes the profit tax rate such, that marginal utility from private con-
sumption equals marginal utility from public consumption. This is not
optimal in the open-loop case, where the government announces a policy of
low profit tax in order to stimulate economic growth. This announcement is
credible, because open-loop implies that the government is committed.
In the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium the pollution tax rate is such
that marginal consumption and pollution effects sum up to zero. The pollu-
tion effect arises from the fact that in the open-loop case it is possible
for the government to deviate from short term optimality. This effect
states that announcing a policy of high pollution tax implies that inves-
ting becomes less attractive to the firms, because more production genera-
tes more pollution as an inevitable byproduct and the latter is punished
more heavily. On the other hand the firms are stimulated more to spend
more money in ways to diminish their own pollution. The summation of these
two effects gives us the pollution effect. In the feedback equilibrium
this pollution effect does not play a role in determining the pollution
tax rate due to the lack of credibility of policy announcements. In the
paper the above conclusions are confirmed in the results of a numerical
example. Another result of this example was that in the feedback case the
pollution tax rate was higher, implying more abatement investments of the
firms resulting in less pollution. We guess that the reason for the pollu-
tion tax rate being higher is that in this way the government tries to
compensate the fact that in the feedback solution income from profit tax
rate is not so high as in the open-loop solution, because in the latter
case the higher capital stock resulted in far more profits.
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